Auxillias Ltd

Features | 14/10/21

When is a complaint, not a complaint? It’s a difficult area, with a number of different nuances, as shown in the recent case of Davis v Lloyds Bank PLC. This case is the first that the Court of Appeal had to consider on whether or not a dispute resolution (DISP) complaint has been made.

It is a requirement that firms must follow detailed rules laid down by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) as to how and when they must deal with complaints by their customers.

The FCA’s DISP rules prescribe how financial institutions must deal with complaints made by their customers. The FCA defines a complaint to be any oral or written expression of dissatisfaction, whether justified or not, from, or on behalf of, any person about the provision of, or failure to provide a financial service which:

• alleges that the complainant has suffered (or may suffer) financial loss, material distress or inconvenience; and

• relates to an activity of that financial institution, which comes under the jurisdiction of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS).

In particular, the regulator’s rules require the financial institution to investigate the complaint, and assess fairly, consistently and promptly whether the complaint should be upheld and what remedial action or redress may be appropriate. It then needs to explain its decision to the customer and undertake that remedial action or pay the redress.

In this case the Court of Appeal, for the first time, had to consider and decide whether the claimant had in fact made a complaint within the meaning of the FCA’s rules. The Court of Appeal, agreeing with the court of first instance, decided that the claimant had not.

The case arose from the widespread mis-selling of interest rate hedging products (IRHPs) by a number of banks in 2000 and onwards. The banks involved agreed with the FCA to review their sales of IRHPs to unsophisticated customers and, if they considered that those IRHPs had been mis-sold, to pay redress.

Mr Davis claimed that he was entitled to bring an action for breach of statutory duty against Lloyds in relation to the second IRHP, not for the original alleged mis-selling (presumably on the basis that such a claim was time-barred), but for the bank’s conduct of the review process.

It appears that Mr Davis was advised that case law had already established that the bank’s conduct of the review process was not actionable in either contract or negligence, nor was it subject to the jurisdiction of FOS.

Mr Davis sought to argue that his correspondence with Lloyds in relation to the review process amounted to a “complaint” within the meaning of the FCA’s DISP rules and that Lloyds’ failure to consider that complaint in accordance with the IRHP review terms agreed with the FCA, amounted to a breach of statutory duty.

That formed the need for the court to consider whether a DISP complaint had been made by Mr Davis. If not, then Mr Davis’ claim was bound to fail.

The Court of Appeal (and the court below) considered the entirety of Mr Davis’ correspondence with the bank, spanning more than six months, as he participated in the IRHP review.

The Court of Appeal considered that the relevant test was whether a reasonable recipient of the communication or series of communications in the position of the bank, within the context in which the communications were made, would constitute a complaint to have been made.

Key to this was the fact that the entry into the review was not dependent upon Mr Davis making a complaint to Lloyds but was as a result of an invitation to participate made by the bank, which Mr Davis accepted.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal considered that references to comments that the customer would have been “better off” without the IRHP and that he had bought the “wrong product” were insufficient to amount to an expression of dissatisfaction. They were no more than statements of fact in hindsight as part of Mr Davis’ acceptance of Lloyds’ offer to review the sale of his IRHPs.

This is the first case in which the Court of Appeal has had to consider whether or not a DISP complaint has been made.

While the facts of the case are somewhat unusual, this will give financial institutions some comfort that the rules do not need them to consider any correspondence requesting or providing information, or making commentary on a customer’s relationship, as amounting to a complaint requiring investigation in accordance with the FCA’s DISP rules.

In particular, in coming to its decision, the Court of Appeal noted the importance for financial institutions to be able to identify when a complaint was made, without a retrospective sift through of a mass of material, given the fact that various time periods under DISP are triggered by the making of a complaint.

Having said that, the definition of “complaint” in DISP is a broad one (and the Court of Appeal confirmed that it was possible for a complaint to be contained in more than one communication).

Financial institutions would be well-advised to interpret the definition widely. Otherwise, not only do they run the risk of court proceedings alleging a breach of statutory duty, but also the potential wrath of the FCA for being non-compliant with its rules.

Auxillias Limited is well-versed in supporting clients in dealing with complaints handling, helping with responses to FOS, to include tailored advice on the best way forward of managing complaints generally and providing clients with training.

For more information, please get in touch with:
Jo Davis at – 07741 240114
Daksha Mistry at – 07458 304068